by:
Harkristuti Harkrisnowo
Introduction
When various international and national research centres proclaimed that Indonesia ranked at the top notch in corruption index, few people –Indonesians and non-Indonesians alike— were flabbergasted. It was as if this proclamation has been taken for granted, need not be debated anymore anywhere, in this ‘state based on law instead of based on power’ as declared in its Constitution. Corruption has been a latent virus to Indonesia, eating away the social institution, spreading in all levels and state institutions. So widespread is this crime that some even asserted that it has become institutionalised and might be a part of the culture.
One of the most significant effects of corruption is the poor quality public service. First of all, the quality of public service is dictated by the professionalism of the civil servants, which is the key link in the chain of public accountability, followed by sufficient budgetary funds managed in an accountable and transparent manner. However, a number of research reveal that civil servants fall short in terms of their quality and professionalism, stemming mainly from the lack of objective and transparent criteria (meritocracy) in their selection, placement, promotion etc. Despite the relatively low salary1 received by civil servants, it does provide security at the minimum level. But most of all, people flocked to enter the civil service –especially the ‘wet agencies’2 due to the high possibility of obtaining additional income. That corruption in civil service is a serious problem is also admitted by civil servants themselves, as revealed in surveys conducted by Institute for Policy and Community Development Studies in 1999/2000and in 2001 by Partnership for Governance Reform.3
In terms of funding, insufficient funding appear to be pervasive in all government agencies. In its recent report, the World Bank reveal several form of what they call ‘under-funding’ in Indonesian budget:
Allocations for operations and maintenance budgets are extremely low and have declined in real terms;
Budgets are released late in the year so that there is not enough time to spend the allocation;
Release of budgetary funds is subject to a variety of unofficial levies by central ministries to meet unspecified costs or merely as speed money;
Allocations are based on an implicit assumption that departments will raise their own funds off-budget.4
As a result, this insufficiency ‘compels’ civil servants to ‘be creative’ –albeit illegal— in finding various method to meet the operational costs, including ‘public participation,’ another word for obtaining money from the public they serve. This situation leads many agencies to acquire and maintain ‘off-budget funding’ from a range of sources, which, understandably, is beyond public scrutiny. Whether these funds constitute ‘state property’ is another source of debates in the legal community, for some courts perceive this as outside the scope of state property. Procurement and auditing state budget are parts of financial management, which are consistently weak in this country, deriving from the lax legal framework implemented in this area. Marks-up in proposals and reports of public expenditure are no longer an extraordinary finding, hence a fertile source of corruption.
It is very unfortunate that only a small number of corruptions ever reached ‘green table,’ and Indonesian jargon for the court proceeding. Despite the political statement to combat corruption, the enactment of various laws and regulations to bring alleged corruptors to justice, the aggressive movement of the civil society to reveal corrupt practices, only a small number were brought before the court. Even those who were unfortunate enough to be caught within the legal net were usually able to hire the best lawyers. Thus the higher one is in the ladder of authority, the higher the possibility of being corrupt, and the lower the possibility of being legally processed.
In comparison, the news cited at the beginning of this paper would never reach the headlines of any national nor regional newspapers, for the perpetrators (or the ‘victim’ depending on how one sees it) are ‘nobody’; they are neither famous nor notorious, and the crimes committed was merely theft, as formulated in Article 362 of Indonesian Penal Code and other so called predatory crimes. Yet one can see that regardless of the triviality of such crimes, apparently people’s law, police law and judge’s law have inflicted far from lenient sentences (both legal and illegal). Blue-collar crimes they committed are thus not worthy to be put in the headlines of any media. Despite the loss of life experienced by these small time and small scale criminals, no one ever cares as to what legal process should be taken against those retaliating against these criminals. Such ‘vigilante justice,’ especially those with extreme violence resulting in the death of a criminal, is impossible to rectify, for life is lost already.
The picture is totally different compared to those alleged as having committed corruption. Known as country infected by corruptive deeds, yet few defendants were brought to the court in Indonesia, a fact continuously lamented by the majority of its citizens. Not surprisingly, this also reflects how the legal apparatus –from the police to the court—conduct their duties in upholding law and justice. Apparently vigilante justice as experienced by small-scale criminals is no threat to these people, for the people could lay their hands on these high status, high ranking people, living and working in fortressed building.
The Antecedents
Nobody would say that corruption is new to Indonesia. Historically, this practice was already started during the Dutch colonial period, where the Dutch somehow utilized the patrimonial value systems held by most Indonesians.
Limited official positions were obtained through gift giving, as were other specialized or privileged treatments. Sukarno, the first President of Indonesia was already concerned with the practice of corruption during his regime –even though it was nothing compared to today— that he established several bodies to deal with this phenomenon. Its was during his regime also that the first generation of corruption laws were enacted, starting from a decree from the Military Commander in 1957, prompted by alleged corruptions within the military, to a National Act of Combating Corruption in 1960. Yet Sukarno finally had to admit his failure to eradicate corrupt practices in the government.
That such corrupt practice continued during Suharto’s regime was without question, as elaborated in a large number of research and analysis throughout the world, although one has to admit that there was also rapid economic growth during the New Order. The laws, which were intended to create order and justice in the country as mandated by the Founding Fathers in the Constitution, were partly utilized to benefits the First Family and its cronies. State policies including presidential decrees were manoeuvred as such to confer monopoly privileges, to grant favourable tax treatment, to award government contract and rights to natural resources and land, and provide special facilities to the special group.
The enactment of Act no. 3 of 1971 was another legal and political pledge to combat corruption, yet in practice very few defendants were brought to the courts, indicating the low level of political will as well as commitment to enforce the law against corruption in the country. Similar to Sukarno, Suharto also established a number of anti corruption units, which were undoubtedly fruitless due to the corrupt nature of the regime itself.
As to why corruption persists despite all legal efforts and public clamour, several variables might contribute to this condition.
1. Lack of political will;
2. Lack of exemplary leadership;
3. Lack of professionalism within the legal system
4. Lack of public participation
Dealing with corruption
The above condition stems from a number of variables. First, the corruptors use a highly sophisticated modus operandi, understanding all legal jargon and tricks, enabling them to commit covert actions that could hardly be snared by law. Secondly, the prosecutors, as legal personnel responsible for compiling evidence and presenting them to the court, are not sufficiently equipped to conduct investigation and constructing a foolproof arraignment and indictment. Third, evidence needed to support the trial proceedings is hard to find.
A part from documentary evidence, testimonies from witnesses constitute an effective evidence for the proceedings, but few people would like to be involved as a witness in corruption cases.5 One of the most-often cited reason is that there is neither sufficient legal protection nor appreciation toward the witness who provide information to the legal apparatus; even some claim that they have been mistreated by, or at least have received unsympathetic treatment from, the police or the prosecutors.6
In addition, there is a tendency that the majority of corruption cases brought into the court would fall into three categories. First, the case was considered as a civil case that falls beyond the authority of criminal justice system. Secondly, there is an inadequacy of evidence supporting that a crime has been committed’ as such the court must acquit the defendant. Third, even though there is ample evidence that a corruption has been committed, yet the court chose to inflict lenient punishment to the defendant.7
Discriminative legal treatment as delineated above between small-scale blue collar crimes v. corruption cases, undoubtedly lead to a question in the society as to the application of equality before the law principle by the legal apparatus: quo vadis the law, or more specifically, quo vadis judges? Both groups have admittedly been committing crimes against property; yet the proceedings and punishment against them appear to result from two significant variables: who the perpetrator is, and who becomes the victim. Perpetrators of corruption are not merely lay people, for they have access to commit corruption “…. by abusing the authority, opportunities or means that one has due to his or her official position. On the other hand, the common criminals generally are those coming from a low strata in the society, who have no such access, are not properly educated, and do not have friends in high places nor the sources to pay for high-ranking lawyers.
The victims of corruption are generally considered invisible, for the main victim is the State. Due to this invisibility, many citizens do not feel that corruption is directly victimizing them in a dangerous manner. This is the opposite of common criminals committing street crimes. People’s fear of crime is high on this sort of crimes, for the possibility of their becoming a victim of street crime is much higher that a corruption. Understandably, to change such perception is not a simple issue.
The above condition shows why perpetrators of corruption are deemed to hold specific ‘position’ in Indonesian criminal justice system. Even in the Corruption Act, the Attorney General is mandated to give priority to such cases.
The Iron Wall???
Why is it difficult to bring the corruptors to justice? In the first place, it is highly imaginable that one official committing corruption of a large amount of money is not known by his subordinates of peer-group. Similarly difficult is to envisage that the perpetrator commits such crime alone, without accessory or accomplice. The fact that such crime is committed indicates the high possibility of the involvement of accomplices and accessories that do the legwork for their boss. As such, during the legal proceedings, naturally they would conceal all possible clues which would lead them to the punishment of the actor intellectual, for it might also drag them into being punished. Thus we will see that these grapevines are significantly accountable to the non-prosecution or the non-punishment of the corruptors.
The problem becomes more complicated when the established pattern of corrupt behaviour has been ‘accepted’ in an institution as part of the ‘corporate culture.’ As such, those newcomers into the institution are compelled to adjust with the existing structure; otherwise they would be isolated from the rest of the institution members. Hence the difficulties of bringing reform, good governance principles into the state institutions, for the strength of the rooted corruption would take years to deal with.
Understandably, this phenomenon brings about the high social cost to the people; it dictates the performance and productivity of the majority of state institutions: no bribe no service, or at least, no proper service. Thus, those who wanted to receive prompt services are somehow compelled to ‘be permissive’ and follow the illegal rules, i.e. payment of bribes, and by and by they become accustomed by this illicit practice. Hence the law of supply and demand applies. This grieving condition has been long lamented by both lay people and business people alike.
Another source of difficulties is related to the criminal justice process, which actually has to serve as a selection means to judge the guilt or innocence of a defendant in corruption cases. The first requirement of a criminal justice process is the existence of evidence of crime. As mentioned in the beginning of this paper, lack of evidence is the main source of acquittal of defendants in corruption cases. Most notably is the position of a witness, who usually is or was a subsidiary or employee of the defendant. Various researches indicate that people are reluctant to serve as a witness in criminal justice process, especially due to the hassles experienced by previous witnesses. In addition, legal protection for both witness and victim alike is still absent from Indonesian law until two years ago.
While it is true that Law no. 31 of 1997 on Combating Corruption stipulates that informer’s identification is not to be revealed and that they are entitled to certain protection form the state, there is always a possibility that those being brought forward to be a witness might also be an accessory to corruption. Consequently, the person might not reveal ‘but the whole truth’ of the corruption since he himself involved in it. On the other hand, it is also possible that due to the legal protection of his identity, the witness who might have enjoyed the fruit of corruption committed by his boss or friends might also enjoy impunity for the crimes he was also involved.
Inevitably the entire above situation brings people to believe that combating corruption is an impossible mission. While the laws and regulations on these crimes have been committed, many believe that it is the mental set, the attitude that mainly dictates the spread and persistence of corruption, and such things could not be changed in a short time. Nonetheless this does not necessarily curb the desire to combat corruption to its roots, as already proved by various measures taken by the state and the civil society alike.
Current Measures to Combat Corruption
Beginning in 1999, several measures were taken to fight corruption in addition to the enactment of Act No. 31 of 1999 on Combating Corruption, as amended by Act no. 20 of 2001. Revising the previous Act of 1970, these Acts contains several significant changes, for example:
a. Stipulating minimum penal sanction;8
b. Increasing the penal sanction, including capital punishment in severe cases of corruption;
c. Proscribing unreported gratification as part of corruption;9
d. Specifying imprisonment for those unable to pay for damages as imposed by the court;
e. Providing reversed burden of proof at the trial level;
f. Stipulating corporations as subject of criminal law;
g. Extending the definition of civil servant;10
h. Providing protection to the witnesses and other informants (whistleblowers);11
i. Empowering the Attorney General Office, as the State lawyer, to pursue civil litigation for corruption cases whose elements of crime are not sufficient to be brought into court, yet the state has already suffered injury through that act;
j. Mandating the creation of an Anti Corruption Commission;
In addition, there are also a number of Acts to boost up the implementation of the above, i.e.:
a. Act no. 28 of 1999 on the Administration of the State which is Free from The Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism;
b. Act no. 15 of 2002 on Money Laundering, as amended by Act no. 25 of 2003;
c. Government Decree no. 57 of 2003 on Witness Protection Mechanism.
Despite the above changes, little development could be witnessed in its implementation. This is more disappointing, for there are also a number institutions created to speed up the combating of corruption:
a. National Ombudsman Commission (KON)
Borrowing concepts from abroad, this Commission was established in 2000 in order to receive complaints from the public on misdeeds committed by public officials, to make recommendations to relevant agencies based on the investigated complaints, and to monitor the compliance of these agencies. Unfortunately, since it was established by a Presidential Decree, the power it has is very limited, that it does not have the legal power to force government agencies to comply with the requests made the Commission. Despite the sheer number of complaints submitted to this Commission, the positive response of the agencies is very poor.
b. Commission to Audit the Wealth of State Officials (KPKPN)
Created to fulfil the mandate in Act no. 28 of 1999, this Commission is in charge of auditing the wealth of the state officials. Similar to the National Ombudsman Commission, there is no power accorded to this Commission to force compliance. Lack of political will is again cited as one of the obstacles for this Commissions performance, yet the support form the civil society including the media is enlightening. In spite of various obstacles, the Commission was able to push for their duties, that 96% of state enterprise managers have declared their assets, along with 86 % of the legislators, 84 % of the judiciary, and only 59% of the executive officers. However, the existence of this Commission was brought to an end by the enactment of Act no. 30 of 2002 on Commission to Combat Corruption. The Commission’s legal measure through judicial review was struck own by the Constitutional Court, which upheld the constitutionality of Act No. 30 of 2002.
c. Centre for Financial Transactions Reporting and Analysis (PPATK)
As part of Indonesia’s commitment to eradicate—or at least to reduce—money laundering which has been plundering Indonesia, this agency is created, to be followed by a Money Laundering Commission. With the main mandate to prevent and combat money-laundering cases, this independent body is in charge with monitoring suspicious transactions relating to financial service providers, and after proper investigation, reporting those, which might indicate to crimes of money laundering to the Police and Attorney General.
The establishment of various NGOs dealing specifically with corruption, such as Indonesian Corruption Watch, Masyarakat Transparansi Indonesia, also assists the above institutions. This civil society’s movement receive great support from the people. Nevertheless, without support from the political parties, law enforcement officials and the judiciary, efforts to eradicate corruption appear to progress very very slowly.
Probably the most important body in combating corruption is Anti Corruption Commission (KPK), which needs special discussion.
The Commission to Combat Corruption (KPK)
After lengthy delays and debates, finally this Commission was established in the end of 2003, a few months late from the stipulation in the Act no. 30 of 2002. A selection committee consisting 13 people coming from of a variety of government and non-government agencies, selected a number of nominees which were then submitted to the Parliament, again to be selected. Despite the furore created by this selection mechanism, Indonesia finally has its first Commission to Combat Corruption, consisting of five Commissioners.12
The Commission to Combat Corruption is one of the latest efforts made by the State to combat corruption. This independent commission, according to the consideration stipulated in the Act no 30 of 2002 which established it, is created “due to the fact that the existing state institutions have not been functioning effectively and efficiently in combating corruption...”
In addition, the lawmakers also emphasize that since corruption is Indonesia:
a Is increasing in quantity and quality year by year;
b Is becoming more systematic and widespread; and
c Constitutes a violation of social and economic rights of the people;
d Brings damages not only to the state finance, but also violating the economic and social rights of the people;
That it should be considered as an extraordinary crime. Hence extraordinary measure is in dire need, i.e. the establishment of this Commission.
Nonetheless, the creation of this commission is not meant to do away with the existing legal institutions (the police and the prosecutor office) originally in charged with corruption. At present, both the prosecutor office and the police handle inquiry and investigation of corruption cases. In some cases, the overlapping functions of these institutions resulted in a number of rivalry, disagreement and debates between them. Some speculate that this additional institution dealing with corruption might provide another source of rivalry. In order to draw a line between the Commission and the existing institutions, so as to avoid unnecessary problems, the Act mandated the Commission to deal with corruption cases with the following conditions:
1. Involving law enforcement officers,13 state apparatus, and other persons who serve as an accomplice or accessory to corruption committed by the officials;
2. Creating apprehension in the society; and or
3. Involving at least one billion rupiah loss in state coffer;
The legislature apparently quite aware that the above limitations might not be sufficient, thus on top of the above, the Commission is also accorded the authority to take over investigation or prosecution of other corruption cases on specific cases. These cases are corruption cases, which fulfil the following criteria:
a. The institutions in charge fail to follow-up reports of alleged corruption submitted by the public;
b. There are unnecessary delays in processing corruption cases;
c. The process is aimed to protect the real perpetrator of corruption;
d. The process is corrupt;
e. There are interventions in the process by the executive, judiciary or parliament; or
f. Other existing condition which, according to the police and the prosecutors, make it difficult to process the case properly and accountably. 14
With the above stipulations, many people feel optimistic as to the performance of the Commission, although some groups are not yet convinced. One of the significant issues following the establishment of this Commission is facilitating them with sufficient infra structure in order to perform accordingly. Today, it is already six months since its establishment, but nothing was heard. According to some insider information, there is financial problem faced by this body that results in limitation of facilities as well as human resources to support its work. This fact prompted the above pessimistic group to question the seriousness and commitment of the government to combat corruption.
Furthermore, this Commission must recruit their own investigators and prosecution officer. Following the words of the law, candidates for these positions are required to possess skills and individual competence to conduct investigation or prosecution. Admittedly, the majority –if not all- of the staff would come either from the Police or the Attorney General Office, for they are the only ones with such specific skills and competence. Again this might create apprehension, for these two institutions are also notorious for corruption. Is has already been speculated that once the Commission select a corrupt officer, who of course might corroborate his or her corrupt colleagues in the previous institutions, the rest of their work would be useless. This is not to say that all police officers and prosecutors are corrupt, for there are certainly some members of those institutions who are quite ‘clean.” Thus it remains in the hands of the Commissioners to select a few from the existing 6,000 prosecutors and 220,000 police officers, or from those already retired.
Selection mechanism is then the only means to sieve the good from the ugly, so to say. Understandably, this would not be an easy nor simple task for the Commission. Assistance from the public must be elicited especially with regard to their track records, that those with previous corrupt practices would be objectively eliminated from the selection process. Whether this would prove to be the outcome of the process remains to be seen.
Recruitment constitutes a significant step for the Commission since the main tasks of this Commission consist of:
a. Conducting coordination with relevant agencies in charge of Combating corruption;
b. Supervising relevant agencies in charge of combating corruption;
c. Conducting inquiry, investigation and prosecution against corruption;
d. Performing preventive actions against corruption; and
e. Monitoring the administration of the state/government.
Since this institution is responsible for many activities relating to combat corruption, the Act mandated the establishment of four divisions in the Commission, i.e. Prevention (including research and public education), Law Enforcement (inquiry, investigation and prosecution), Information and Data, and Internal Supervision and Public Complaint.
A new provision which is not found in other laws and regulations in Indonesia is found in Article 36, is the prohibition of all Commissioners, its Board of Advisor and staff to conduct direct or indirect relation with the suspect or other parties related to corruption cases processed by the institution. Even though such provision is already found in many rules and Code of Ethics of Law Enforcement Officers in other countries, apparently this is the first time it was promulgated in an official Act in Indonesia. It remains to be seen how the Commission upholds this provision. One provision that might support the implementation of this rule is that the position of those working in the Commission constitute as an aggravating elements when they are criminally processed.
Rules of evidence as stipulated in Act no. 8 of 1981 are considered no longer sufficient to dispense justice in corruption cases. For example, the judiciary is highly reluctant to accept computerized data, other electronically produced evidence, photographs etc that might serve as evidence in criminal cases. Once in 1997, an NGO provided a bank balance sheet to the police as proof of corruption of a high-ranked officer; but this was not regarded as legal evidence that the cases was dropped. Thus the stipulation of Article 26 a of Act no. 20 of 2001 broadening the definition of evidence that it includes:
a. Information which are said, sent, received or recorded electronically by optical equipments or those similar to them;
b. All kinds of documents, i.e. any recorded data or information which could be read and heard through any means including electronic, including writings, voices, pictures, maps, blueprints, photographs, letters, number, perforations that could have specific meanings.
Another supporting rule is reversed burden of proof. However, this mechanism is intended to be utilized at t he trial stage, instead of at the investigation stage. As such the police or the prosecutors are still obliged to search and find evidence of corruption. This is admittedly a new concept in Indonesian law, and consequently caused uproar especially in the lawyer’s community, who accused the legislature as violating the defendants’ human rights. That the legislature itself, whose members are not exempted from suspected corruption and money politics, remain persistent in maintaining this rule, indicated that even they consider corruption as a serious virus threatening Indonesia.
The Corruption Court
While the establishment of the Commission to Combat Corruption is a reflection of distrust against the existing legal institutions, consequently the involvements of the judiciary in processing corruption cases become dilemmatic as well. Since people’s trust toward the judiciary, including the Supreme Court which should serve as the last bastion of justice, is very low, creating an accountable and distinct corruption court becomes a necessity.15
The establishment of Corruption Court is provided in Act no. 30 of 2002 which also established the Commission to Combat Corruption. Even though this new court is under the umbrella of the General Court,16 instead of a totally new division in the judicial system, rules and regulations in conjunction with this court are not similar to other regular courts. First, each panel of judges (from the court of the first instance to the Supreme Court) consists of two career judges and three ad-hoc judges. Second, the ad-hoc judges are appointed by the President as recommended by the Chief Justice. Third, there are additional requirements in comparison with regular judges in terms of a) experienced as a judge for at least ten years, b) experienced in trying corruption cases; c) having competence and high moral integrity; and d) had never received indisciplinary sanction.17 There are more pre-requisites for ad-hoc judges, for example, has reached the age of at least 40, has never committed an misconduct, and has a good reputation. Finally, there are time limitations for processing corruption cases at the trial stage: ninety days at the court of the first instance, sixty days at the appeal court, and ninety days at the Supreme Court level.
This time limitation is intended to uphold the principles for judicial processing set out in Act no. 14 of 1974 ‘simple, speedy and at low-cost.’ Some people suspected the delays and lengthy judicial process are rooted from the corruptive practice in the judiciary and other related legal institution. According to a number research report, judicial proceeding are often delayed and thus hampered due to the absence of one of the parties, including the judges; lack of evidence is another source of delay, or so is the claim of one of the parties. Thus in essence the fact that the law limit the time of proceeding is quite welcome in the legal community.
However, judging from the experience of other courts at any level dealing with corruption, time limitation might also provide an obstacle for the judiciary. What would be the legal consequences should the time limits are violated or not fulfilled? Apparently no provision in the Act provides an answer to this question. Whether this is a fortunate or unfortunate coincidence, the answer remains with the legislature.
Another issue worth noting is remuneration of these judges. It is no secret that the low salary of judges is accused as one of the contributing factors that lead them to corruption, in addition to limited facility provided for their works. Various research, however, reveal that actually instead of low salary, it is the systemic mismanagement in all state institutions that becomes the culprit of all. The World Bank even stated that ‘compensation plays little role in creating positive incentives for integrity on the part of the civil service….Pay is … a factor in corruption because of a highly opaque and non-transparent system of compensation administration… 18 Nevertheless, this issue is another homework for the government to work with.
One of the longstanding problems in processing corruption cases in Indonesia is the lack of willing witness to come forward, as discussed earlier. Act no. 31 of 1999 as well as several other Acts promulgated in that year has already contained provisions on witness protection. Unfortunately, until last year the provisions are not followed up by the necessary implementing rules and regulation, that they remain a paper lion, an Indonesian term for useless or unimplementable law. The trials conducted by the Human Rights Court prompted the first Government Regulation on Witness Protection in Gross Violation of Human Rights Cases,19followed by similar regulation on Money Laundering Cases.20 Yet, those in connection with corruption cases are still absent.
Several provisions with regard to protecting witness are:
a. Identification of informants is not to be revealed by anybody during trials;21
b. Legal protection is provided for persons who participate in combating corruption; 22and
c. the Commission is to provide protection to witness or informants;23
Without further elaboration as to the rights and protection for these informants and witnesses, it is doubtful that the Commission would be able to be successful in its quest to combat corruption. Without further ado, the government must submit its Witness Protection Draft to the Parliament, or the Parliament itself deliberate and enact the draft which is already submitted by civil society to its hand.
Finally….
Many new rules, regulation, institutions have been created to support efforts for combating corruption. Yet it would not suffice without any political support from the ruling elite, as well as the following:
a. promoting objective and just law enforcement;
b. reinforcing control mechanism at all levels of state administration, including infliction of sanction for its violators;
c. enhancing personnel management system starting from recruitment to promotion and monitoring of each civil servants and other public officials;
d. revising financial and procurement management system of all state institutions;
e. eliciting public participation for combating corruption;
f. creating a new information system that is open to the public, in order to enhance public control toward state administration.KHN
(Footnotes)
1 It was calculated that the salary received by most public servants account for only 30 % of their income. The rest comes from various sources, both legal and illegal such as meeting money, transport cost, kickback commission, and speed money (to speed up services provided) etc.
2 This term refers to those agencies –mostly the regulatory agencies—, which are prone to corruption, and where unofficial payment far exceeds the official salary.
3 Nick Manning, Ranjana Mukherjee, Omer Gokcekus and Bert Hofman (2001). Performance Orientation Among Public Officials in Indonesia Report on a Survey of Public Officials. World Bank, mimeo. The World Bank-Netherlands Partnership Program (2000)
4 The World Bank (2003). Combating Corruption in Indonesia: Enhancing Accountability for Development. Jakarta: The World Bank.
5 This reluctance is also found in other criminal cases as well. Several possible reasons for this reluctance include, but not limited to, distrust to the legal officers, apathy that this proceeding would result in the punishment of the defendant, lack of legal protection of witness and victims.
6 Harkristuti Harkrisnowo et al (1999). Laporan Hasil Penelitian Mengenai Perlindungan Saksi (Research Report on Witness Protection). Jakarta: Fakultas Hukum dan ICW.
7 Several corruption cases show this tendency. In one case involving a son of the former president, a sentence of 18 months was delivered to the defendant who was proved to have committed corruption. For example, the Chair of the Parliament who was charged of corruption of 40 billion rupiah was sentenced to 3 years in prison by the court of the first instance and the Court of Appeal. However, the Supreme Court acquits him for what he did was under the instruction of the then President Habibie.
8 The minimum penal sanctions range from one year of imprisonment and a fine of fifty million rupiah, to four year of imprisonment and a fine of two hundred million rupiah, As found in Article 2 – 12 Act No. 31 of 1999 and Article 5 – 12 b Act no. 20 of 2001
9 Article 12 B Act No. 20 of 2001.
10 The definition of Civil servants was extended among others to those receiving salary or remuneration from the corporations, which received State or public capital or facility, and regional government.
11 As stipulated in Article 31 and Article 41 e.
12 These Commissioners come from a variety of professions: police, prosecutor, business, academicians and NGO.
13 Unlike those in other countries, law enforcement officers in Indonesia include the police officers, the prosecutors and the judges.
14 Excerpted from Article 9 of Act no. 30 of 2002.
15 As also recommended by The National Law Commission based on its research on the Judiciary. Jakarta: National Law Commission, 2002. see also in its website www.komisihukum.go.id
16 Act no. 14 of 1970 on Principles of the Judicial Power recognizes four types of court in Indonesia: the General Court, The Military Court, the Religious Court and the Administrative Court.
17 Article 57 par. 1 Act no. 30 of 2002.
18 The World Bank, supra.
19 Government regulation no. 2 of 2002.
20 Government Regulation no. 57 of 2003.
21 Article 31 par (1) Act No. 31 of 1999.
22 Article 41 par (2) e Act No. 31 of 1999.
23 Article 15 par a Act no. 30 of 2002.
source : komisihukum.go.id
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